All 12 criteria of the published standard, including
the 9 not yet examined. A criterion that has not been
assessed is shown as unexamined rather than omitted — otherwise a record
could look complete by leaving out the awkward questions.
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01
No persistent mass ALPR program
Not met The municipality does not operate a persistent automated license plate reader program that routinely records ordinary traffic and builds a searchable history of people’s movements.
The Flock deployment was removed and the contract terminated in 2025, which settles the present tense. But the City publicly indicated it planned to continue evaluating ALPR technology. The standard requires a forward-looking rejection of persistent mass tracking, not a pause between procurements, so the available evidence does not establish this criterion.
City of Cambridge, Massachusetts — checked Aug 14, 2026
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02
No vendor workaround
Not yet examined The municipality has not simply replaced one platform with another providing substantially equivalent dragnet capability.
Cannot be resolved while the city is openly evaluating replacement ALPR technology.
What would resolve it Procurement records across all vendors, not only the one that attracted public attention.
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03
No routine access to another agency’s dragnet
Not yet examined The municipality does not evade the standard by routinely querying regional, private, vendor, or neighbouring ALPR databases as a substitute for operating its own network.
Not yet examined.
What would resolve it Mutual-aid agreements, regional fusion or task-force participation, vendor account access, department policy.
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04
Targeted investigative exception only under defined lawful authority
Not yet examined Short-term or case-specific use is tied to individualized legal justification, a warrant or court order where required, or a tightly defined exigent circumstance documented by policy.
Not yet examined.
What would resolve it Written department policy, authorization logs, ordinance text.
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05
No persistent facial recognition or biometric identification of the public
Met No persistent facial-recognition or biometric identification system aimed at the general public.
Cambridge has a municipal facial recognition ban.
City of Cambridge, Massachusetts — checked Aug 14, 2026
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06
No purchase of sensitive historical location data from data brokers
Not yet examined The municipality does not purchase sensitive historical location data to circumvent warrant or court-order requirements.
Not yet examined.
What would resolve it Procurement records, purchase orders, department policy.
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07
Democratic control of new surveillance technology
Met New systems capable of identifying, tracking, or profiling the public require advance public notice, an impact and use policy, and approval by the elected legislative body or an equivalently accountable process.
Cambridge has a surveillance-technology ordinance governing adoption of new systems.
City of Cambridge, Massachusetts — checked Aug 14, 2026
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08
Public surveillance technology inventory
Not yet examined The municipality publishes what surveillance technologies it uses and for what purpose.
Not yet examined.
What would resolve it Published inventory, currency of the most recent version.
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09
Retention and deletion limits
Not yet examined Personally identifying surveillance data is minimized and deleted on defined schedules unless legitimately tied to a specific investigation or legal obligation.
Not yet examined.
What would resolve it Written retention schedule, department policy, contract terms.
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10
Sharing controls
Not yet examined Sensitive data is not casually pooled, sold, or made broadly searchable by outside agencies; sharing rules and legal standards are public.
Not yet examined.
What would resolve it Sharing configuration, data-sharing agreements, published policy.
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11
Annual transparency reporting
Not yet examined The municipality publishes meaningful annual reports covering use, sharing, complaints, audits, policy violations, costs, and material changes.
Not yet examined.
What would resolve it Published reports and whether they are current and substantive.
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12
Function-over-brand protection
Not yet examined Policies apply to capabilities rather than vendor names, so future technology cannot bypass the spirit of the standard by changing product labels.
Not yet examined.
What would resolve it Ordinance and policy text — how the scope clause is written.