{
 "version": 1,
 "generatedAt": "2026-08-16T01:24:55.487Z",
 "standardVersion": "1.0",
 "license": "CC BY 4.0",
 "documentation": "https://unsurveilled.org/verified/standard/",
 "disclaimer": "Verified Unsurveilled is an independent civil-liberties designation based on publicly documented municipal policies, systems, and practices evaluated against Unsurveilled's published standard. It is not issued by any government, standards body, regulator, or court. Status may be suspended or withdrawn if qualifying policies change or contradictory evidence is discovered.",
 "standard": [
  {
   "id": "no-mass-alpr",
   "label": "No persistent mass ALPR program",
   "requirement": "The municipality does not operate a persistent automated license plate reader program that routinely records ordinary traffic and builds a searchable history of people’s movements.",
   "evidence": "Municipal code, procurement records, department policy, technology inventory, council minutes."
  },
  {
   "id": "no-vendor-workaround",
   "label": "No vendor workaround",
   "requirement": "The municipality has not simply replaced one platform with another providing substantially equivalent dragnet capability.",
   "evidence": "Procurement records across all vendors, not only the one that attracted public attention."
  },
  {
   "id": "no-dragnet-access",
   "label": "No routine access to another agency’s dragnet",
   "requirement": "The municipality does not evade the standard by routinely querying regional, private, vendor, or neighbouring ALPR databases as a substitute for operating its own network.",
   "evidence": "Mutual-aid agreements, regional fusion or task-force participation, vendor account access, department policy."
  },
  {
   "id": "targeted-exception-only",
   "label": "Targeted investigative exception only under defined lawful authority",
   "requirement": "Short-term or case-specific use is tied to individualized legal justification, a warrant or court order where required, or a tightly defined exigent circumstance documented by policy.",
   "evidence": "Written department policy, authorization logs, ordinance text."
  },
  {
   "id": "no-biometric-dragnet",
   "label": "No persistent facial recognition or biometric identification of the public",
   "requirement": "No persistent facial-recognition or biometric identification system aimed at the general public.",
   "evidence": "Municipal code, department policy, technology inventory, procurement records."
  },
  {
   "id": "no-data-broker-location",
   "label": "No purchase of sensitive historical location data from data brokers",
   "requirement": "The municipality does not purchase sensitive historical location data to circumvent warrant or court-order requirements.",
   "evidence": "Procurement records, purchase orders, department policy."
  },
  {
   "id": "democratic-control",
   "label": "Democratic control of new surveillance technology",
   "requirement": "New systems capable of identifying, tracking, or profiling the public require advance public notice, an impact and use policy, and approval by the elected legislative body or an equivalently accountable process.",
   "evidence": "Surveillance-technology ordinance, council approval records."
  },
  {
   "id": "public-inventory",
   "label": "Public surveillance technology inventory",
   "requirement": "The municipality publishes what surveillance technologies it uses and for what purpose.",
   "evidence": "Published inventory, currency of the most recent version."
  },
  {
   "id": "retention-limits",
   "label": "Retention and deletion limits",
   "requirement": "Personally identifying surveillance data is minimized and deleted on defined schedules unless legitimately tied to a specific investigation or legal obligation.",
   "evidence": "Written retention schedule, department policy, contract terms."
  },
  {
   "id": "sharing-controls",
   "label": "Sharing controls",
   "requirement": "Sensitive data is not casually pooled, sold, or made broadly searchable by outside agencies; sharing rules and legal standards are public.",
   "evidence": "Sharing configuration, data-sharing agreements, published policy."
  },
  {
   "id": "annual-transparency",
   "label": "Annual transparency reporting",
   "requirement": "The municipality publishes meaningful annual reports covering use, sharing, complaints, audits, policy violations, costs, and material changes.",
   "evidence": "Published reports and whether they are current and substantive."
  },
  {
   "id": "function-over-brand",
   "label": "Function-over-brand protection",
   "requirement": "Policies apply to capabilities rather than vendor names, so future technology cannot bypass the spirit of the standard by changing product labels.",
   "evidence": "Ordinance and policy text — how the scope clause is written."
  }
 ],
 "summary": {
  "verified": 0,
  "candidate": 2,
  "underReview": 1,
  "notQualified": 2,
  "suspended": 0,
  "withdrawn": 0
 },
 "records": [
  {
   "jurisdictionId": "austin-tx",
   "jurisdictionName": "Austin",
   "state": "Texas",
   "stateAb": "TX",
   "status": "not-qualified",
   "badgeEligible": false,
   "standardVersion": "1.0",
   "verificationDate": null,
   "lastReviewedAt": "2026-08-14",
   "nextReviewDue": null,
   "summary": "Austin's Flock contract was cancelled in 2025 after a sustained organizing campaign — a real win. EFF subsequently reported that Austin continued to use ALPR through Axon. Austin is published here as the explicit demonstration of the vendor-neutral rule: cancelling one company does not qualify a community if substantially equivalent mass ALPR capability remains in place.",
   "criteria": [
    {
     "criterionId": "no-mass-alpr",
     "label": "No persistent mass ALPR program",
     "result": "fail",
     "explanation": "EFF reported that Austin continued using ALPR through Axon after the Flock contract was cancelled. Equivalent capability remaining in place fails this criterion regardless of which company supplies it.",
     "sourceIds": [
      "eff-austin-flock-cancellation"
     ],
     "verifiedAsOf": "2026-08-14"
    },
    {
     "criterionId": "no-vendor-workaround",
     "label": "No vendor workaround",
     "result": "fail",
     "explanation": "This is the definitional case for the criterion: one vendor replaced by another providing substantially equivalent capability.",
     "sourceIds": [
      "eff-austin-flock-cancellation"
     ],
     "verifiedAsOf": "2026-08-14"
    },
    {
     "criterionId": "no-dragnet-access",
     "label": "No routine access to another agency’s dragnet",
     "result": "unknown",
     "explanation": "Not yet examined.",
     "sourceIds": [],
     "verifiedAsOf": null
    },
    {
     "criterionId": "targeted-exception-only",
     "label": "Targeted investigative exception only under defined lawful authority",
     "result": "unknown",
     "explanation": "Not yet examined.",
     "sourceIds": [],
     "verifiedAsOf": null
    },
    {
     "criterionId": "no-biometric-dragnet",
     "label": "No persistent facial recognition or biometric identification of the public",
     "result": "unknown",
     "explanation": "Not yet examined.",
     "sourceIds": [],
     "verifiedAsOf": null
    },
    {
     "criterionId": "no-data-broker-location",
     "label": "No purchase of sensitive historical location data from data brokers",
     "result": "unknown",
     "explanation": "Not yet examined.",
     "sourceIds": [],
     "verifiedAsOf": null
    },
    {
     "criterionId": "democratic-control",
     "label": "Democratic control of new surveillance technology",
     "result": "unknown",
     "explanation": "Not yet examined.",
     "sourceIds": [],
     "verifiedAsOf": null
    },
    {
     "criterionId": "public-inventory",
     "label": "Public surveillance technology inventory",
     "result": "unknown",
     "explanation": "Not yet examined.",
     "sourceIds": [],
     "verifiedAsOf": null
    },
    {
     "criterionId": "retention-limits",
     "label": "Retention and deletion limits",
     "result": "unknown",
     "explanation": "Not yet examined.",
     "sourceIds": [],
     "verifiedAsOf": null
    },
    {
     "criterionId": "sharing-controls",
     "label": "Sharing controls",
     "result": "unknown",
     "explanation": "Not yet examined.",
     "sourceIds": [],
     "verifiedAsOf": null
    },
    {
     "criterionId": "annual-transparency",
     "label": "Annual transparency reporting",
     "result": "unknown",
     "explanation": "Not yet examined.",
     "sourceIds": [],
     "verifiedAsOf": null
    },
    {
     "criterionId": "function-over-brand",
     "label": "Function-over-brand protection",
     "result": "fail",
     "explanation": "The outcome itself demonstrates the absence of function-level protection: the policy result changed the vendor without changing the capability.",
     "sourceIds": [
      "eff-austin-flock-cancellation"
     ],
     "verifiedAsOf": "2026-08-14"
    }
   ],
   "openQuestions": [
    {
     "question": "What is the current scope, retention, and sharing configuration of Austin's ALPR use through Axon?",
     "resolveVia": "public-records-request"
    },
    {
     "question": "Was the Axon ALPR capability procured before, during, or after the Flock cancellation?",
     "resolveVia": "public-records-request"
    }
   ],
   "disqualifiers": [
    "EFF reported that Austin continued to use ALPR through Axon after the Flock contract was cancelled. Substantially equivalent mass ALPR capability remaining in place is disqualifying under criteria 1, 2, and 12."
   ],
   "challengeStatus": "none",
   "canonicalUrl": "https://unsurveilled.org/verified/austin-tx/"
  },
  {
   "jurisdictionId": "cambridge-ma",
   "jurisdictionName": "Cambridge",
   "state": "Massachusetts",
   "stateAb": "MA",
   "status": "not-qualified",
   "badgeEligible": false,
   "standardVersion": "1.0",
   "verificationDate": null,
   "lastReviewedAt": "2026-08-14",
   "nextReviewDue": null,
   "summary": "Cambridge has a surveillance-technology ordinance, a municipal facial recognition ban, and terminated its Flock deployment in 2025. It is among the better-governed cities in the country on this issue. It still does not currently qualify, because the City indicated it planned to continue evaluating ALPR technology — which is not the forward-looking rejection of persistent mass tracking the standard requires.",
   "criteria": [
    {
     "criterionId": "no-mass-alpr",
     "label": "No persistent mass ALPR program",
     "result": "fail",
     "explanation": "The Flock deployment was removed and the contract terminated in 2025, which settles the present tense. But the City publicly indicated it planned to continue evaluating ALPR technology. The standard requires a forward-looking rejection of persistent mass tracking, not a pause between procurements, so the available evidence does not establish this criterion.",
     "sourceIds": [
      "cambridge-flock-termination-statement"
     ],
     "verifiedAsOf": "2026-08-14"
    },
    {
     "criterionId": "no-vendor-workaround",
     "label": "No vendor workaround",
     "result": "unknown",
     "explanation": "Cannot be resolved while the city is openly evaluating replacement ALPR technology.",
     "sourceIds": [],
     "verifiedAsOf": null
    },
    {
     "criterionId": "no-dragnet-access",
     "label": "No routine access to another agency’s dragnet",
     "result": "unknown",
     "explanation": "Not yet examined.",
     "sourceIds": [],
     "verifiedAsOf": null
    },
    {
     "criterionId": "targeted-exception-only",
     "label": "Targeted investigative exception only under defined lawful authority",
     "result": "unknown",
     "explanation": "Not yet examined.",
     "sourceIds": [],
     "verifiedAsOf": null
    },
    {
     "criterionId": "no-biometric-dragnet",
     "label": "No persistent facial recognition or biometric identification of the public",
     "result": "pass",
     "explanation": "Cambridge has a municipal facial recognition ban.",
     "sourceIds": [
      "cambridge-flock-termination-statement"
     ],
     "verifiedAsOf": "2026-08-14"
    },
    {
     "criterionId": "no-data-broker-location",
     "label": "No purchase of sensitive historical location data from data brokers",
     "result": "unknown",
     "explanation": "Not yet examined.",
     "sourceIds": [],
     "verifiedAsOf": null
    },
    {
     "criterionId": "democratic-control",
     "label": "Democratic control of new surveillance technology",
     "result": "pass",
     "explanation": "Cambridge has a surveillance-technology ordinance governing adoption of new systems.",
     "sourceIds": [
      "cambridge-flock-termination-statement"
     ],
     "verifiedAsOf": "2026-08-14"
    },
    {
     "criterionId": "public-inventory",
     "label": "Public surveillance technology inventory",
     "result": "unknown",
     "explanation": "Not yet examined.",
     "sourceIds": [],
     "verifiedAsOf": null
    },
    {
     "criterionId": "retention-limits",
     "label": "Retention and deletion limits",
     "result": "unknown",
     "explanation": "Not yet examined.",
     "sourceIds": [],
     "verifiedAsOf": null
    },
    {
     "criterionId": "sharing-controls",
     "label": "Sharing controls",
     "result": "unknown",
     "explanation": "Not yet examined.",
     "sourceIds": [],
     "verifiedAsOf": null
    },
    {
     "criterionId": "annual-transparency",
     "label": "Annual transparency reporting",
     "result": "unknown",
     "explanation": "Not yet examined.",
     "sourceIds": [],
     "verifiedAsOf": null
    },
    {
     "criterionId": "function-over-brand",
     "label": "Function-over-brand protection",
     "result": "unknown",
     "explanation": "Not yet examined.",
     "sourceIds": [],
     "verifiedAsOf": null
    }
   ],
   "openQuestions": [
    {
     "question": "Has Cambridge concluded its evaluation of ALPR technology, and with what outcome?",
     "resolveVia": "council-agenda"
    },
    {
     "question": "Does Cambridge access any regional or state ALPR database operated by another agency?",
     "resolveVia": "public-records-request"
    }
   ],
   "disqualifiers": [
    "The City publicly indicated it planned to continue evaluating ALPR technology after terminating its Flock contract. The standard requires a forward-looking rejection of persistent mass tracking, and an open evaluation is not that."
   ],
   "challengeStatus": "none",
   "canonicalUrl": "https://unsurveilled.org/verified/cambridge-ma/"
  },
  {
   "jurisdictionId": "eugene-or",
   "jurisdictionName": "Eugene",
   "state": "Oregon",
   "stateAb": "OR",
   "status": "under-review",
   "badgeEligible": false,
   "standardVersion": "1.0",
   "verificationDate": null,
   "lastReviewedAt": "2026-08-14",
   "nextReviewDue": null,
   "summary": "Eugene ended its Flock contract in December 2025 and, in 2026, its council began work on a broader city surveillance policy. The outcome turns entirely on what that policy says once adopted — specifically, whether it rejects equivalent mass ALPR capability from any vendor, or only settles the Flock question. Under review pending the adopted text.",
   "criteria": [
    {
     "criterionId": "no-mass-alpr",
     "label": "No persistent mass ALPR program",
     "result": "unknown",
     "explanation": "The Flock contract ended in December 2025. Whether Eugene rejects equivalent capability going forward depends on the surveillance policy still under development, which is not yet available to read.",
     "sourceIds": [
      "opb-eugene-springfield-end-flock",
      "lookout-eugene-surveillance-policy"
     ],
     "verifiedAsOf": "2026-08-14"
    },
    {
     "criterionId": "no-vendor-workaround",
     "label": "No vendor workaround",
     "result": "unknown",
     "explanation": "Not yet examined.",
     "sourceIds": [],
     "verifiedAsOf": null
    },
    {
     "criterionId": "no-dragnet-access",
     "label": "No routine access to another agency’s dragnet",
     "result": "unknown",
     "explanation": "Not yet examined.",
     "sourceIds": [],
     "verifiedAsOf": null
    },
    {
     "criterionId": "targeted-exception-only",
     "label": "Targeted investigative exception only under defined lawful authority",
     "result": "unknown",
     "explanation": "Not yet examined.",
     "sourceIds": [],
     "verifiedAsOf": null
    },
    {
     "criterionId": "no-biometric-dragnet",
     "label": "No persistent facial recognition or biometric identification of the public",
     "result": "unknown",
     "explanation": "Not yet examined.",
     "sourceIds": [],
     "verifiedAsOf": null
    },
    {
     "criterionId": "no-data-broker-location",
     "label": "No purchase of sensitive historical location data from data brokers",
     "result": "unknown",
     "explanation": "Not yet examined.",
     "sourceIds": [],
     "verifiedAsOf": null
    },
    {
     "criterionId": "democratic-control",
     "label": "Democratic control of new surveillance technology",
     "result": "unknown",
     "explanation": "A city surveillance policy was under development as of mid-2026. This criterion turns on the adopted text.",
     "sourceIds": [
      "lookout-eugene-surveillance-policy"
     ],
     "verifiedAsOf": null
    },
    {
     "criterionId": "public-inventory",
     "label": "Public surveillance technology inventory",
     "result": "unknown",
     "explanation": "Not yet examined.",
     "sourceIds": [],
     "verifiedAsOf": null
    },
    {
     "criterionId": "retention-limits",
     "label": "Retention and deletion limits",
     "result": "unknown",
     "explanation": "Not yet examined.",
     "sourceIds": [],
     "verifiedAsOf": null
    },
    {
     "criterionId": "sharing-controls",
     "label": "Sharing controls",
     "result": "unknown",
     "explanation": "Not yet examined.",
     "sourceIds": [],
     "verifiedAsOf": null
    },
    {
     "criterionId": "annual-transparency",
     "label": "Annual transparency reporting",
     "result": "unknown",
     "explanation": "Not yet examined.",
     "sourceIds": [],
     "verifiedAsOf": null
    },
    {
     "criterionId": "function-over-brand",
     "label": "Function-over-brand protection",
     "result": "unknown",
     "explanation": "This is the criterion the adopted policy should be read against first — whether it governs a capability or a contract.",
     "sourceIds": [],
     "verifiedAsOf": null
    }
   ],
   "openQuestions": [
    {
     "question": "Has Eugene adopted its city surveillance policy, and what does the final text say?",
     "resolveVia": "council-agenda"
    },
    {
     "question": "Does the adopted policy address ALPR capability generally, or only the terminated Flock contract?",
     "resolveVia": "council-agenda"
    },
    {
     "question": "Does Eugene access any regional or state ALPR database operated by another agency?",
     "resolveVia": "public-records-request"
    }
   ],
   "disqualifiers": [],
   "challengeStatus": "none",
   "canonicalUrl": "https://unsurveilled.org/verified/eugene-or/"
  },
  {
   "jurisdictionId": "yellow-springs-oh",
   "jurisdictionName": "Yellow Springs",
   "state": "Ohio",
   "stateAb": "OH",
   "status": "candidate",
   "badgeEligible": false,
   "standardVersion": "1.0",
   "verificationDate": null,
   "lastReviewedAt": "2026-08-14",
   "nextReviewDue": null,
   "summary": "Yellow Springs has a broad surveillance-technology ordinance that treats technologies including ALPRs and biometric surveillance as surveillance technology subject to an approval process, requires review of preexisting uses, requires annual reporting for approved systems, and makes conflicting contracts prohibited. That is the strongest governance framework among our current leads. The decisive open question is what is actually approved and in use.",
   "criteria": [
    {
     "criterionId": "no-mass-alpr",
     "label": "No persistent mass ALPR program",
     "result": "unknown",
     "explanation": "Unexamined, and decisive. A rigorous approval process is entirely compatible with having approved an ALPR system. What is currently approved and operating must be established before this criterion resolves in either direction.",
     "sourceIds": [],
     "verifiedAsOf": null
    },
    {
     "criterionId": "no-vendor-workaround",
     "label": "No vendor workaround",
     "result": "unknown",
     "explanation": "Not yet examined.",
     "sourceIds": [],
     "verifiedAsOf": null
    },
    {
     "criterionId": "no-dragnet-access",
     "label": "No routine access to another agency’s dragnet",
     "result": "unknown",
     "explanation": "Not yet examined.",
     "sourceIds": [],
     "verifiedAsOf": null
    },
    {
     "criterionId": "targeted-exception-only",
     "label": "Targeted investigative exception only under defined lawful authority",
     "result": "unknown",
     "explanation": "Not yet examined.",
     "sourceIds": [],
     "verifiedAsOf": null
    },
    {
     "criterionId": "no-biometric-dragnet",
     "label": "No persistent facial recognition or biometric identification of the public",
     "result": "unknown",
     "explanation": "Not yet examined.",
     "sourceIds": [],
     "verifiedAsOf": null
    },
    {
     "criterionId": "no-data-broker-location",
     "label": "No purchase of sensitive historical location data from data brokers",
     "result": "unknown",
     "explanation": "Not yet examined.",
     "sourceIds": [],
     "verifiedAsOf": null
    },
    {
     "criterionId": "democratic-control",
     "label": "Democratic control of new surveillance technology",
     "result": "pass",
     "explanation": "The municipal code subjects surveillance technology — expressly including ALPRs and biometric surveillance — to an approval process, and requires review of preexisting uses rather than grandfathering whatever was already installed. This is the criterion Yellow Springs satisfies most convincingly.",
     "sourceIds": [
      "yellow-springs-surveillance-code-a",
      "yellow-springs-surveillance-code-b"
     ],
     "verifiedAsOf": "2026-08-14"
    },
    {
     "criterionId": "public-inventory",
     "label": "Public surveillance technology inventory",
     "result": "unknown",
     "explanation": "Not yet examined.",
     "sourceIds": [],
     "verifiedAsOf": null
    },
    {
     "criterionId": "retention-limits",
     "label": "Retention and deletion limits",
     "result": "unknown",
     "explanation": "Not yet examined.",
     "sourceIds": [],
     "verifiedAsOf": null
    },
    {
     "criterionId": "sharing-controls",
     "label": "Sharing controls",
     "result": "unknown",
     "explanation": "Not yet examined.",
     "sourceIds": [],
     "verifiedAsOf": null
    },
    {
     "criterionId": "annual-transparency",
     "label": "Annual transparency reporting",
     "result": "pass",
     "explanation": "The code requires annual reporting for approved surveillance systems. Whether reports have in fact been published on schedule is a separate question, listed as open below.",
     "sourceIds": [
      "yellow-springs-surveillance-code-b"
     ],
     "verifiedAsOf": "2026-08-14"
    },
    {
     "criterionId": "function-over-brand",
     "label": "Function-over-brand protection",
     "result": "pass",
     "explanation": "The code regulates surveillance technology by capability and category rather than by vendor or product name, and makes conflicting contracts prohibited.",
     "sourceIds": [
      "yellow-springs-surveillance-code-a",
      "yellow-springs-surveillance-code-b"
     ],
     "verifiedAsOf": "2026-08-14"
    }
   ],
   "openQuestions": [
    {
     "question": "Which surveillance technologies are currently approved and in use in Yellow Springs?",
     "resolveVia": "public-records-request"
    },
    {
     "question": "Does any persistent ALPR or equivalent mass-tracking capability exist, whether operated locally or accessed regionally?",
     "resolveVia": "public-records-request"
    },
    {
     "question": "Have the required annual surveillance reports actually been published, and are they current?",
     "resolveVia": "public-records-request"
    },
    {
     "question": "Is there a published, current surveillance technology inventory?",
     "resolveVia": "public-records-request"
    },
    {
     "question": "What retention and sharing rules apply to approved systems?",
     "resolveVia": "public-records-request"
    }
   ],
   "disqualifiers": [],
   "challengeStatus": "none",
   "canonicalUrl": "https://unsurveilled.org/verified/yellow-springs-oh/"
  },
  {
   "jurisdictionId": "ypsilanti-mi",
   "jurisdictionName": "Ypsilanti",
   "state": "Michigan",
   "stateAb": "MI",
   "status": "candidate",
   "badgeEligible": false,
   "standardVersion": "1.0",
   "verificationDate": null,
   "lastReviewedAt": "2026-08-14",
   "nextReviewDue": null,
   "summary": "Ypsilanti adopted Ordinance No. 1401 in 2022, prohibiting the installation or use of electronic license-plate scanning devices in the city. That is unusually direct and makes Ypsilanti the strongest immediate candidate to audit against the Verified Unsurveilled standard. It is not a designation. Nine of the twelve criteria are currently unexamined.",
   "criteria": [
    {
     "criterionId": "no-mass-alpr",
     "label": "No persistent mass ALPR program",
     "result": "pass",
     "explanation": "Ordinance No. 1401 prohibits the installation or use of electronic license-plate scanning devices within the city. This is a direct prohibition in municipal law rather than a lapsed contract or a policy preference, which is the strongest form this criterion can take.",
     "sourceIds": [
      "ypsilanti-ordinance-1401"
     ],
     "verifiedAsOf": "2026-08-14"
    },
    {
     "criterionId": "no-vendor-workaround",
     "label": "No vendor workaround",
     "result": "pass",
     "explanation": "The ordinance is written against the device category — electronic license-plate scanning devices — rather than against a named vendor or product, so a rebranded system would not escape it.",
     "sourceIds": [
      "ypsilanti-ordinance-1401"
     ],
     "verifiedAsOf": "2026-08-14"
    },
    {
     "criterionId": "no-dragnet-access",
     "label": "No routine access to another agency's dragnet",
     "result": "unknown",
     "explanation": "Unexamined. A city prohibition on operating ALPRs does not by itself prevent its department from querying a county, regional, state, or vendor database operated by someone else. This is the single most likely way for an otherwise strong record to fail, and it must be resolved before any designation.",
     "sourceIds": [],
     "verifiedAsOf": null
    },
    {
     "criterionId": "targeted-exception-only",
     "label": "Targeted investigative exception only under defined lawful authority",
     "result": "unknown",
     "explanation": "Unexamined. Whether the ordinance contains exceptions, and how any case-specific use is authorized and documented, has not been assessed.",
     "sourceIds": [],
     "verifiedAsOf": null
    },
    {
     "criterionId": "no-biometric-dragnet",
     "label": "No persistent facial recognition or biometric identification of the public",
     "result": "unknown",
     "explanation": "Unexamined. Ordinance No. 1401 addresses license-plate scanning. It does not speak to facial recognition or other biometric identification, and no separate Ypsilanti provision has been reviewed.",
     "sourceIds": [],
     "verifiedAsOf": null
    },
    {
     "criterionId": "no-data-broker-location",
     "label": "No purchase of sensitive historical location data from data brokers",
     "result": "unknown",
     "explanation": "Unexamined. No procurement review has been conducted.",
     "sourceIds": [],
     "verifiedAsOf": null
    },
    {
     "criterionId": "democratic-control",
     "label": "Democratic control of new surveillance technology",
     "result": "unknown",
     "explanation": "Unexamined. Whether Ypsilanti requires advance public notice, a use policy, and legislative approval before adopting new surveillance technology generally — as distinct from banning one category — has not been assessed.",
     "sourceIds": [],
     "verifiedAsOf": null
    },
    {
     "criterionId": "public-inventory",
     "label": "Public surveillance technology inventory",
     "result": "unknown",
     "explanation": "Unexamined. No published inventory has been located.",
     "sourceIds": [],
     "verifiedAsOf": null
    },
    {
     "criterionId": "retention-limits",
     "label": "Retention and deletion limits",
     "result": "unknown",
     "explanation": "Unexamined for surveillance data generally. A prohibition on one collection method does not establish retention rules for the data the city does collect.",
     "sourceIds": [],
     "verifiedAsOf": null
    },
    {
     "criterionId": "sharing-controls",
     "label": "Sharing controls",
     "result": "unknown",
     "explanation": "Unexamined.",
     "sourceIds": [],
     "verifiedAsOf": null
    },
    {
     "criterionId": "annual-transparency",
     "label": "Annual transparency reporting",
     "result": "unknown",
     "explanation": "Unexamined. No annual surveillance report has been located.",
     "sourceIds": [],
     "verifiedAsOf": null
    },
    {
     "criterionId": "function-over-brand",
     "label": "Function-over-brand protection",
     "result": "pass",
     "explanation": "The ordinance regulates a device capability rather than a product name, satisfying this criterion for the ALPR category specifically. Whether the principle extends to surveillance technology generally is part of the democratic-control criterion, which remains unexamined.",
     "sourceIds": [
      "ypsilanti-ordinance-1401"
     ],
     "verifiedAsOf": "2026-08-14"
    }
   ],
   "openQuestions": [
    {
     "question": "Does the Ypsilanti Police Department have access to any county, regional, state, or vendor ALPR database operated by another agency?",
     "resolveVia": "public-records-request"
    },
    {
     "question": "Does Ypsilanti have a general surveillance-technology approval ordinance, or only the ALPR prohibition?",
     "resolveVia": "public-records-request"
    },
    {
     "question": "Does the city or department use facial recognition or other biometric identification in any form?",
     "resolveVia": "public-records-request"
    },
    {
     "question": "Has the city purchased location data from any data broker?",
     "resolveVia": "public-records-request"
    },
    {
     "question": "Is a surveillance technology inventory published, and is it current?",
     "resolveVia": "public-records-request"
    },
    {
     "question": "Does the city publish an annual surveillance transparency report?",
     "resolveVia": "public-records-request"
    },
    {
     "question": "Have there been amendments, repeals, or exceptions to Ordinance No. 1401 since 2022?",
     "resolveVia": "council-agenda"
    }
   ],
   "disqualifiers": [],
   "challengeStatus": "none",
   "canonicalUrl": "https://unsurveilled.org/verified/ypsilanti-mi/"
  }
 ]
}